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Abstract 
The Australian Constitution played a significant role in underpinning the result in the Aid/Watch Case.  It was 
invoked by the majority to support their conclusion that a body can be a ‘charitable institution’ despite engaging 
in political activities. The use of the Constitution in this way came as a surprise. The case extended an existing 
constitutional principle relating to freedom of political communication from its electoral base into the protection 
of the political activities of non-government organisations. This may have future ramifications for those 
organisations in other areas, as well as further implications for the development of what it means to be a charity 
in Australia. This article examines the use of the Australian Constitution in the Aid/Watch Case. It explains how 
the High Court was able to invoke the Constitution in defining what it means to be a ‘charitable institution’. It 
also examines the implications of that reasoning for the development of charitable law in Australia. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The Australian Constitution played a significant role in underpinning the result in the 
Aid/Watch Case.1
 
 It was invoked by the majority to support their conclusion that a body can 
be a ‘charitable institution’ despite engaging in political activities. 
The use of the Constitution in this way came as a surprise. The case extended an existing 
constitutional principle relating to freedom of political communication from its electoral base 
into the protection of the political activities of non-government organisations. This may have 
future ramifications for those organisations in other areas, as well as further implications for 
the development of what it means to be a charity in Australia.  
 
This article examines the use of the Australian Constitution in the Aid/Watch Case. It 
explains how the High Court was able to invoke the Constitution in defining what it means to 
be a ‘charitable institution’. It also examines the implications of that reasoning for the 
development of charitable law in Australia. 
 
                                                 
1 Aid/Watch Inc v Commission of Taxation (2010) 272 ALR 417. 
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Political activities and ‘charitable institutions’ 
In contrast to the modern practice of parliaments seeking to define key terms with often 
extraordinary precision, ‘charitable institution’ is not at all defined in Australia’s key tax 
laws, such as the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The term is mentioned merely by 
way of indicating a type of entity that is entitled to significant tax concessions. This leaves 
the courts with the task of filling in what has proved to be an enormous gap in the law. They 
must determine the characteristics of a ‘charitable institution’, including questions such as 
whether such institutions can engage in political activities. 
 
Current law on what is a ‘charitable institution’ can be traced back to the preamble to the 
English Parliament’s 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses (also known as the Statute of 
Elizabeth). The ‘modern’ starting point for applying these words lies in the 1891 decision of 
Lord Macnaghten in the United Kingdom House of Lords in Commissioners for Special 
Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel.2
 
 He classified charities into four divisions: 
‘Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of 
poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of 
religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under 
any of the preceding heads. 
 
Subsequent decisions in the United Kingdom have found that a body cannot fall into any of 
these categories if it engages in political activities. Hence, in the leading case of Bowman v 
Secular Society Ltd3
 
 in 1917, Lord Parker of Waddington in the House of Lords stated: 
a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not 
because it is illegal, for every one is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful 
means a change in the law, but because the Court has no means of judging whether a 
proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and therefore 
cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift. 
 
This decision has led to recognition in the United Kingdom that a body cannot be a charity if 
it has a ‘political object’, such as to promote change in the law or government policy. In 
2006, for example, in Hanchett-Stamford v Attorney-General4
 
, Lewison J recognised ‘the 
fundamental principle that if one of the objects or purposes of an organisation is to change the 
law, it cannot be charitable’. 
                                                 
2 [1891] AC 531 at 583. 
3 [1917] AC 406 at 442. 
4[2009] Ch 173 at 181-182. 
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At the time of the Aid/Watch Case, the Australian High Court had not yet determined whether 
to follow this British line of reasoning. As a matter of common law, or judge-made law, the 
matter was open for determination. It is also open to the High Court to apply Australian 
constitutional doctrine in reaching its decision. 
 
Ultimately, a majority of the High Court decided not to follow the British line of reasoning 
stemming from Bowman. They held that a body can be a ‘charitable institution’ and still 
engage in political activities. In large part, this rested upon their development of the common 
law. However, the decision also relied upon principles derived from the Australian 
Constitution. Indeed, in deciding not to follow the United Kingdom path, the majority stated: 
 
The starting point must be that the remarks of Lord Parker in Bowman were not 
directed to the Australian system of government established and maintained by the 
Constitution itself. That circumstance, as explained in what follows, provides a 
significant consideration in deciding the content of the common law of Australia 
respecting trusts for ‘political objects’.5
 
 
Australia’s Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights6, nor even any express recognition 
of freedom of speech. However, beginning in 1992 at the time of the Mason Court with the 
decisions in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills7 and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth,8
 
 the High Court has recognised that the Constitution implies that Australian 
parliaments cannot pass laws that unduly interfere with the ability of Australians to 
communicate about political matters. The freedom is an indispensable part of the requirement 
in sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution that the members of the Federal Parliament must be 
‘directly chosen by the people’. 
The implied freedom takes precedence over statute and common law, and so is the most 
powerful form of legal authority. If it can be shown that the freedom applies, it trumps 
everything else. The freedom can also be used in a less direct sense in assisting courts with 
the development of the common law. For example, in the area of defamation law it has been 
used by the High Court to help shape the common law in regard to the defences that are 
appropriate in dealing with speech about political figures.9
                                                 
5 Aid/Watch Inc v Commission of Taxation (2010) 272 ALR 417 at 427.. 
 
6 George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (UNSW Press, 2007). 
7 (1992) 177 CLR 1. 
8 (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
9 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
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The implied freedom may be powerful, but it has been rarely used. It has often been narrowly 
construed and judges have tended to be reluctant to apply it in other contexts, such as in the 
development of the common law. It was surprising then to see the freedom used as it was in 
the Aid/Watch Case. 
 
It was recognised in the Aid/Watch Case that Aid/Watch is a self-described ‘activist’ group 
concerned with the relief of international poverty. The organisation seeks to achieve its goals 
through unorthodox means for a charity. Rather than raising money for or engaging directly 
in anti-poverty initiatives, it campaigns for improvements in the delivery of Australia’s 
overseas aid. It has been sharply critical of government, and has not been shy in proposing 
major reforms to Australian aid policy. 
 
The primary question was whether the public advocacy of Aid/Watch could permit the entity 
to fall within the fourth category of the definition of a charity: that is, could it be classed as a 
body concerned with ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’. A majority of the High 
Court held that Aid/Watch did fit within this definition. The judges were fortified in this 
conclusion by the Australian Constitution and the implied freedom of political 
communication. In this respect, the joint majority judgment of Chief Justice French and 
Justices Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell reasoned in the following steps:10
 
 
1. The foundation of the Australia’s system of law is supplied by the Constitution.  
2. The provisions of the Constitution mandate a system of representative and responsible 
government with a universal adult franchise, including a system for amendment of the 
Constitution in which the proposed law to effect the amendment is to be submitted to 
the electors. 
3. Communication between electors and legislators and the officers of the executive, and 
between electors themselves, on matters of government and politics is ‘an 
indispensable incident’ of that constitutional system. 
4. Thus, the system of law which applies in Australia postulates for its operation 
‘agitation’ for legislative and political changes. 
5. While personal rights of action are not by these means bestowed upon individuals, the 
Constitution informs the development of the common law. 
6. In this case, the common law should develop so as to recognise that bodies can both 
possess charitable status and ‘agitate’ for legislative and political changes. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Aid/Watch Inc v Commission of Taxation (2010) 272 ALR 417 at 428-429. 
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The majority concluded: 
 
The system of law which applies in Australia thus postulates for its operation ... 
‘agitation’ for legislative and political changes ... [I]t is the operation of these 
constitutional processes which contributes to the public welfare. A court 
administering a charitable trust for that purpose is not called upon to adjudicate the 
merits of any particular course of legislative or executive action or inaction which is 
the subject of advocacy or disputation within those processes. 
 
Tucked away towards the end of the majority judgment, this reasoning may well have proved 
decisive. The recognition of political ‘agitation’ as a source of protected communication 
informed the development of the common law such that the political ‘agitation’ could be seen 
as being for the public welfare. The result was that ‘in Australia there is no general doctrine 
which excludes from charitable purposes “political objects”’,11 and thus that charitable status 
is not inconsistent with freedom of speech by non-government organisations about matters of 
government and public policy. In the specific case of Aid/Watch, the majority held that the 
‘generation by lawful means of public debate ... concerning the efficiency of foreign aid 
directed to the relief of poverty ... is a purpose beneficial to the community within the fourth 
head in Pemsel’.12
 
 
Implications 
The Aid/Watch Case demonstrates how the Constitution and implications drawn from it can 
exert a powerful influence on the law in other areas. All such law must ultimately be 
referable to the Constitution, and the Constitution can play a major role in its development. In 
Aid/Watch, it was significant that the implied freedom was used in a case not about the rights 
of electors, but those of a non-government organisation. 
 
It was an extension to take freedom from its electoral context as provided by sections 7 and 
24 of the Constitution into the charitable realm. Indeed, it may well be that the Constitution 
can play a like role in other areas where the non-government sector seeks protection or 
recognition of its role in engaging in political debate. Should a statute seek to close down 
public advocacy or ‘agitation’ for legislative and political changes by such organisations, 
there may be good grounds to argue that this breaches the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
11 Aid/Watch Inc v Commission of Taxation (2010) 272 ALR 417 at 429. 
12 Aid/Watch Inc v Commission of Taxation (2010) 272 ALR 417 at 429. 
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The use of the Constitution in the Aid/Watch Case also suggests paths for the future 
development of what it means to be a ‘charitable institution’. First, the use of the Constitution 
implies limits upon the power of Australian parliaments to narrow the definition of what it 
means to be a charity, such as by seeking to legislate to exclude bodies engaged in political 
activities from that definition. 
 
The Aid/Watch Case was an interpretation of federal tax legislation in light of the common 
law definition of what it means to be a charity. This would normally mean that Parliament 
can change that legislation so as to narrow the definition. However, the High Court’s reliance 
upon the Constitution may prove to be a barrier. If the definition of a charity was altered to 
prevent bodies from engaging in public debate about matters of government and public 
policy, this could run foul of the constitutional freedom of political communication and be 
struck down13. Such considerations also apply in the event of an Australian parliament 
seeking to enact a new, comprehensive definition of charities for taxation or other laws.14
 
 
Any such definition must also comply with the implied freedom of political communication. 
Second, the Constitution may assist with resolving questions left after the Aid/Watch Case 
about whether other bodies engaged in political activities can be classed as a ‘charitable 
institution’. These questions might be answered by the courts in an open-ended way purely 
by reference to the common law, but it is possible that the Constitution may be again used. 
 
In so far as the Constitution is applied, it would support the protection, and thus the 
classification as a ‘beneficial purpose’, of ‘agitation’ directed at matters such as the criticism 
of government policy and attempts to change the law. Such matters lie at the heart of the 
implied freedom of political communication because they go to the discussion of matters that 
affect the choice made by electors under sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution. The High 
Court did not set out in detail what it means by ‘agitation’ in this context, but it would seem 
clear that it extends to matters such as the publication of critical comment or the provocation 
of public debate with a view to generating support for legal and policy change.  
 
                                                 
13 For analogous reasoning, see Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
14 See generally I F Sheppard, Robert Fitzgerald and David Gonski, Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of 
Charities and Related Organisations (June 2001). 
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The use of the Constitution in this way may also suggest to a court restrictions upon which 
bodies may be recognised as a charity. This limited form of protected ‘agitation’ was made 
clear by the fact that in describing ‘agitation’ as something in which a charity may engage, 
the majority of the High Court was careful to only ever use the phrase ‘“agitation”’ for 
legislative and political changes’. This reflects the limited scope of the constitutional 
freedom. The implied freedom only extends to protection of ‘agitation’ relating to political 
matters that affect the choice of electors at the ballot box. It does not relate to other forms of 
speech, such as matters of artistic freedom or commercial speech that do not have a 
electoral/political element. 
 
For example, it may be that bodies that advocate change directed at purely corporate interests 
(perhaps criticism of the overseas operations of Australian business interests) would not fall 
under the umbrella of constitutional protection, and thus charitable status. More generally, 
bodies which criticise or engage in advocacy about matters outside of the parliamentary and 
governmental realm, such as in regard to the medical profession or medical research, would 
not gain the protection of the Constitution and so may not be recognised as being charitable. 
Again, it must be remembered that the High Court majority did not speak about ‘agitation’ in 
general as being protected by the Constitution, but only ‘“agitation” for legislative and 
political change’.15
 
 
Conclusion 
The Aid/Watch Case represents a good outcome for Australian democracy. It means that a 
range of charitable organisations can take part in public debate with greater freedom and 
confidence. These and other bodies promise to make an important contribution. Organisations 
dedicated to fighting poverty will be able to criticise governments where federal and State 
policies are inadequate in areas like dental care, mental health and homelessness. In these and 
other areas, such bodies can contribute a longer term, non-party political perspective on what 
needs to be done to remedy major problems and policy challenges. These bodies should not 
be muzzled by the threat that playing such a public role could threaten their status as a 
charity. 
 
The fact that the Constitution underpinned this result is of undoubted significance. It implies 
a level of protection for such organisations that puts ‘agitation’ by them for legislative and 
                                                 
15 Aid/Watch Inc v Commission of Taxation (2010) 272 ALR 417 at 429. 
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political change beyond the scope of parliamentary override. The use of the Constitution also 
represents recognition by the High Court of the value of the public activities of these non-
government organisations. It suggests a broadly conceived civil society in which robust 
advocacy and criticism of government laws and policies is something that is protected under 
the name of ensuring that the Australian public can cast an informed vote at the ballot box. 
